Amendments for Fuel Cell Systems on Board of Ships



- Main Amendments -

(1) Effective date : 1 Jul. 2020 (Date of which the contract for construction is signed)

• The Guidance for Fuel Cell Systems on Board of Ships have been totally revised reflecting IMO draft of interim guidelines for the safety of ships using fuel cell power installations.

	Present		Amendment	Reason
	CHAPTER 1 GENERAL		CHAPTER 1 GENERAL	<pre><guidance board="" cell="" for="" fuel="" of="" on="" ships="" systems=""></guidance></pre>
	Section 1 General		Section 1 General	(Amendment) - Reflect DRAFT INTERIM
1	01. Application	101.	Application <u>(2020)</u>	GUIDELINES FOR THE SAFETY OF SHIPS USING
	1. This Guidance is to apply to <u>fuel cell systems</u> on board of ships used as auxiliary or main source of power.	1.	This Guidance is to apply to with <u>fuel cell power in-</u> <u>stallations</u> on board of ships used as auxiliary or main source of power.	FUEL CELL POWER INSTALLATIONS
	 In this Guidance, only the gaseous fuels lighter than air in ambient conditions as well as liquid fuels with flash point below 60°C are regarded as "FC fuel", regardless of Pt 8 Ch 2 101. 1 of the Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships(hereafter referred to as "the Rules for Steel Ships"). Gas may be stored in gaseous or liquid state. Typical fuels that may be relevant are natural gas, methanol, hydrogen or diesel fuels. Liquid fuels with flash point above 60°C are to follow the requirements for normal fuel in the Rules for Steel Ships, Pt 5 Ch 6. Sec.9 and Pt 8 Ch 2 Sec 1. Items not specified in this Guidance are to be in accordance with each relevant requirements inapplicable to fuel cell systems in ships. 	2.	The scope of this Guidance covers the requirements for the arrangement and design of fuel cell power installations in 102. 3 (4) and the spaces containing such installations. Regulations such as storage, preparation, distribution, etc. of fuel outside the above scope are to be covered by the relevant regulations of Rules for Ships using Low-flash-point Fuels depending on the fuel used. Additional safety considerations may be required when using rich hydrogen reformed fuel as fuel in fuel cells. 3. Items not specified in this Guidance relating to fuel cell power installation are to be in accordance with each relevant requirement in Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships except for the requirements inapplicable to fuel cell power installations in ships.	<pre><application date="" date:="" of<br="" the="">contract for construction on or after 1 July 2020> - Reflect introduction.</application></pre>
	4. Items not included in this Guidance may comply with ISO, IEC, KS or equivalent recognized standards by the appropriate consideration of the Society.	4.	Items not included in this Guidance may comply with ISO, IEC, KS or equivalent standards as deemed appropriate by the Society.	
	5. Additional requirements to this Guidance may be required.	5.	Additional requirements to this Guidance may be required.	
	6. Where <u>installations of fuel cell systems</u> on board of ships are intended, those are to be accepted by the flag state in advance.	6.	Where <u>fuel cell power installations</u> on board of ships are intended, those are to be accepted by the flag state in advance.	
1	02. Definitions	102.	. <u>General <i>(2020)</i></u>	
	The definitions of terms are to follow the Rules for Steel Ships, unless otherwise specified in this Guidance. 1. ~ 38. (omitted)	1.	The definitions of terms are to follow the Rules for Steel Ships, unless otherwise specified in this Guidance. ~ 38. (deleted)	- replaced by 3.

Present	Amendment	Reason
	1. Goal The goal of this Guidance is to provide safe and reliable delivery of electrical and / or thermal energy through the use of fuel cell technology.	- Reflect 1.2 and Introduction.
	 denvery of electrical and 7 of thermal energy through the use of fuel cell technology. 2. Functional requirements This Guidance is related to the goals and functional requirements of Rules for Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels. In particular, the following apply. (1) The safety, reliability and dependability of the systems are to be equivalent to those achieved with new and comparable conventional oil-fuelled main and auxiliary machinery installations, regardless of the specific fuel cell type and fuel. (2) The probability and consequences of fuel-related hazards are to be limited to a minimum through arrangement and system design, such as ventilation, detection and safety actions. In the event of gas leakage or failure of the risk reducing measures, necessary safety actions are to be initiated. (3) The design philosophy is to ensure that risk reducing measures and safety actions for the fuel cell power installation do not lead to an unacceptable loss of power. (4) Hazardous areas are to be restricted, as far as practicable, to minimize the potential risks that might affect the safety of the ship, persons on board and equipment. (5) Equipment installed in hazardous areas is to be minimized to that required for operational purposes and is to be suitably and appropriately certified. (6) Fuel cell spaces are to be configured to prevent any unintended accumulation of explosive, flammable or toxic gas concentrations.	- Reflect 1.3
	<u>damages.</u>	

 (8) Sources of ignition in hazardous areas are to be minimized to reduce the probability of explosions. (9) Piping systems and conceptessue relief arrangements that are of suitable design, construction and installation for their intended application is to be provided. (10) Machinery, systems and components are to be designed, constructed, installed, operated, maintained and protected to ensure safe and reliable operation. (11) Fuel cell spaces are to be arranged and located such that a fire or explosion in either will not lead to an unacceptable loss of power or render equipment in other compartments inoperable. (12) Suitable control, alam, monitoring and shutdown systems are to be provided to ensure safe and reliable operation. (13) Fixed leakage detection, suitable for all spaces and areas concerned is to be arranged. (14) Fire detection, protection and extinction measures appropriate to the hazards concerned are to be provided. (15) Commissioning, triats and maintenance of fuel systems and age suitization machinery are to satisfy the goal in terms of safety, availability and reliability. (16) The technical documentation is to permit an assessment of the compliance of the system and its components with the applicable rules, guidelines, design standards used and the principles related to safety, availability. (17) A single fullue in a technical system or component is not to lead to an unsafe or the provided for operation. (18) Safe access is to be provided for operation, inspection and maintenance. 	Present	Amendment	Reason
		 (8) Sources of ignition in hazardous areas are to be minimized to reduce the probability of explosions. (9) Piping systems and overpressure relief arrangements that are of suitable design, construction and installation for their intended application is to be provided. (10) Machinery, systems and components are to be designed, constructed, installed, operated, maintained and protected to ensure safe and reliable operation. (11) Fuel cell spaces are to be arranged and located such that a fire or explosion in either will not lead to an unacceptable loss of power or render equipment in other compartments inoperable. (12) Suitable control, alarm, monitoring and shutdown systems are to be provided to ensure safe and reliable operation. (13) Fixed leakage detection suitable for all spaces and areas concerned is to be arranged. (14) Fire detection, protection and extinction measures appropriate to the hazards concerned are to be provided. (15) Commissioning, trials and maintenance of fuel systems and gas utilization machinery are to satisfy the goal in terms of safety, availability and reliability. (16) The technical documentation is to permit an assessment of the compliance of the system and its components with the applicable rules, guidelines, design standards used and the principles related to safety, availability, maintainability and reliability. (17) A single failure in a technical system or component is not to lead to an unsafe or unreliable situation. (18) Safe access is to be provided for operation, inspection and maintenance. 	

Present	Amendment	Reason
	2 Definitions	- Reflect 14
	<u>5. Demilions</u>	Reflect 1.4
	For the purpose of these Guidances, the terms used have	
	the meanings defined in the following paragraphs. Terms	
	not defined have the same meaning as in SOLAS chapter	
	II-2 and Rules for Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels.	
	(1) Fuel cell is a source of electrical power in which the	
	chemical energy of a fuel cell fuel is converted directly	
	into electrical and thermal energy by electrochemical	
	<u>oxidation.</u>	
	(2) Fuel reformer is the arrangement of all related fuel-re-	
	torming equipment for processing gaseous or liquid pri-	
	(2) Fuel cell newer eveter is the group of components	
	(5) Fuel cell power system is the group of components	
	cell(s) fuel reformers if fitted and associated nining	
	systems	
	(4) Fuel cell power installation is the fuel cell power	
	system and other components and systems required to	
	supply electrical power to the ship. It may also include	
	ancillary systems for the fuel cell operation. (refer to	
	Fig 1.1)	
	(5) Fuel cell space is a space containing fuel cell power	
	systems or parts of fuel cell power systems. (refer to	
	Fig 1.2)	
	(6) Reformed fuel is hydrogen rich gas generated in the	
	<u>fuel reformer.</u>	
	(/) Primary fuel is fuel supplied to the fuel cell power	
	(8) Exponent and is exhaust from the reference or anode	
	(6) Exhibits gas is exhibits from the reformer of anode	
	(9) Exhaust air is exhaust from the cathode side of the	
	fuel cell	
	(10) Process air is air supply to the reformer and/or the	
	cathode side of the fuel cell.	
	(11) Ventilation air is air used to ventilate the fuel cell	
	space.	





Present	Amendment	Reason
103. Class notations	103. Class notations	
 <u>Ships satisfying the requirements of this Guidance may be given a notation as additional special feature notations as follows:</u> Where the fuel cell power is used for propulsion, essential or emergency services, a notation "FC-PWR" <u>may be assigned.</u> Where the fuel cell power is not used for propulsion, essential or emergency services, a notation "FC" <u>may be assigned.</u> 	 Fuel cell power installations used as auxiliary or main source of power is to comply with this Guidances and is to be given a notation as additional special feature notations as follows: Where the fuel cell power is used for propulsion, es- sential or emergency services, a notation "FC-PWR" is to be assigned. Where the fuel cell power is not used for propulsion, essential or emergency services, a notation "FC" is to be assigned. 	- To clarify that this Guidances and notation are mandatory.
104. <u>Equivalence</u>	104 Alternative design (2020)	
Special equipment, which is not appropriate to apply the re- quirements of this Guidance or not specified in this Guidance, may be accepted by the Society provided that the Society is satisfied that such equipment is equivalent to or above those complying with the requirements of this Guidance.	 Anternative design (2020) Anternative design (2020) These Guidances contain functional requirements for all appliances and arrangements related to the usage of fuel cell technology. Appliances and arrangements of fuel cell power systems may deviate from those set out in these Guidances, provided such appliances and arrangements meet the intent of the goal and functional requirements concerned and provide an equivalent level of safety of the relevant sections. The equivalence of the alternative design is to be demonstrated as specified in SOLAS Reg. II-1/55 and approved by the Society. However, the Society is not to allow operational methods or procedures to be applied as an alternative to a particular fitting, material, appliance, apparatus, item of equipment or type thereof which is prescribed by these Guidances. 	- Reflect 1.5
105. Exclusion from the Guidance The Society cannot assume responsibility for other technical characteristics for fuel cell systems not covered by this Guidance. However, the Society may advise on such matters upon application.	105. Exclusion from the Guidance The Society cannot assume responsibility for other technical characteristics for fuel cell systems not covered by this Guidance. However, the Society may advise on such matters upon application.	- Section 2 is deleted because the scope is limited to fuel cell power installation and Ch. 4, 202, of Bules for
Section 2 Approval of Plans and Documents <omitted></omitted>	Section 2 Approval of Plans and Documents <deleted></deleted>	Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels is capable to cover.

Present	Amendment	Reason
CHAPTER 2 CLASSIFICATION SURVEYS <omitted></omitted>	CHAPTER 2 CLASSIFICATION SURVEYS <deleted></deleted>	- Chapter 2 is deleted be- cause the scope is limited to fuel cell power in-
Section 1 Arrangements And System Design	INSTALLATION (2020)	stallation and Ch 4, Sec 3 of Rules for Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels is ca- pable to cover.
101. General	101. General	- Ch 3 Structures and equipments move to Ch 2.
 For any new or altered concept or configuration, a risk analysis is to be conducted in order to ensure that any risks arising from the use of the fuel cell systems affecting the structural strength and the integrity of the ship are addressed. Consideration is to be given to the hazards associated with installation, operation, and maintenance, following any reasonably fore-seeable failure. The risks are to be analysed using acceptable and recognized risk analysis techniques and loss of function, component damage, fire, explosion and electric shock are as a minimum to be considered. The analysis is to ensure that risks are eliminated wherever possible. Risks which cannot be eliminated are to be mitigated as necessary. Details of risks, and the means by which they are mitigated, are to be included in the operating manual. An explosion in any space containing open gas sources is not to: (1) ~ (8) <omitted></omitted> In case where the power supply to propulsion or essential service is delivered by the fuel cell system, this power supply to propulsion or essential service. 	 For any new or altered concept or configuration, a risk assessment in accordance with Ch 3, Sec 2 of Rules for Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels is to be conducted in order to ensure that any risks arising from the use of the fuel cell systems affecting persons on board, the environment, the structural strength and the integrity of the ship are addressed. Consideration is to be given to the hazards associated with installation, operation, and maintenance, following any reasonably foreseeable failure. The risks are to be analysed using acceptable and recognized risk analysis techniques and loss of function, component damage, fire, explosion and electric shock are as a minimum to be considered. The analysis is to ensure that risks are eliminated wherever possible. Risks which cannot be eliminated are to be mitigated as necessary. Details of risks, and the means by which they are mitigated, are to be included in the operating manual. An explosion in any space containing open gas sources is not to: (1) ~ (8) <omitted></omitted> In case where the power supply to propulsion or essential service is delivered by the fuel cell system, this power supply to propulsion or essential service is to be maintained in accordance with Pt 6, Ch 1, 1601. 3 of Rules for the Classification of Steel Ships even if one component of the fuel cell installation becomes inoperative. 	 Deleted because Ch 3, 201. 3 of Rules for Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels is capable to cover. Deleted because Ch 3, Sec.3 of Rules for Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels is capable to cover.
<u>5. <omitted></omitted></u>	<u>3.</u> <same as="" present="" the=""></same>	

Present	Amendment	Reason
Present <u>102. ~ 110. <omitted></omitted></u> <u>Section 2 Fire Protection and Fire Extinction</u> <deleted></deleted>	Amendment 102. ~ 110. <deleted> Section 2 Design Principles for Fuel Cell Power Installations 201. Fuel cell spaces 1. Fuel cell spaces In order to minimize the probability of a gas explosion in a fuel cell space, it is to meet the requirements of this sec- tion, or an equivalent safety concept. The fuel cell space concept is such that the space is designed to mitigate haz- ards to non-hazardous levels under normal conditions, but</deleted>	Reason- Deleted because the scopeis limited to fuel cell powerinstallation Deleted Sec 2 because thescope is limited to fuel cellpower installation and RulesforShipsusingLow-flashpointFuelsiscapable to cover Reflect 2.1
	ards to non-hazardous levels under normal conditions, but under certain abnormal conditions may have the potential to become hazardous. In the event of abnormal conditions in- volving gas hazards, emergency shutdown (ESD) of non-safe equipment (ignition sources) and components is to be automatically executed while equipment or components in use or active during these conditions are to be of a cer- tified safe type.	
	 Electrical installations and equipment are to comply with the requirements in Sec 4. Within the fuel cell space concept, a single failure may result in a release of primary fuel, reformed fuel or hazardous gases into the space. Ventilation or inerting, if necessary, are designed to accommodate a probable maximum leakage scenario due to technical failures. Failures leading to dangerous gas concentrations, e.g. gas pipe ruptures or blow out of gaskets are covered by explosion pressure relief devices and ESD arrangements. 	

Present	Amendment	Reason
Present	 Amendment 202. Arrangement and access 1. Fuel cell power installations are to be designed for automatic operation and equipped with all the monitoring and control facilities required for safe operation of the system. 2. It is to be possible to shut down the fuel cell power system from an easily accessible location outside the fuel cell spaces. 3. Means to safely remove the primary and reformed fuel from the fuel cell power system are to be provided. 4. Means are to be provided to set a fuel cell power installation into a safe state for maintenance and shutdown. 5. For the auxiliary systems of the fuel cell power system where primary fuel or reformed fuel may leak directly into a system medium (e.g. cooling water), such auxiliary systems are to be equipped with appropriate extraction and detection means fitted as close as possible after the media outlet from the system in order to prevent gas dispersion. Gas extracted from the auxiliary system media is to be vented to a safe location on the open deck. 6. The reforming equipment, if fitted, may be an integrated part of the fuel cell or arranged as an independent unit with reformed fuel piping connected to the fuel cells. 7. Fuel cell spaces are to be arranged outside of accommodation spaces, service spaces, machinery spaces of category A and control stations. 9. Fuel cell spaces are to be designed to safely contain fuel leakages and be provided with suitable leakage detection systems. Fuel cell spaces are to be arranged to avoid the accumulation of hydrogen-rich gas by having simple geometrical shape and no obstructing structures in the upper part of the st	Reason

Present	Amendment	Reason
	 10. Fuel cell spaces containing fuel reformers are to also comply with the requirements relevant for the primary fuel. 11. Where an independent and direct access to the fuel cell spaces from the open deck cannot be arranged, access to fuel cell spaces is to be through an airlock. For fuel cell spaces too small to be entered, the requirement for an airlock may be waived, subject to approval by the Administration. However, such fuel cell spaces are to be gas-freed before opening. 	
	203. Atmospheric control of fuel cell spaces	- Reflect 2.3.1
	<u>1. General</u> <u>Protection of fuel cell spaces by an external boundary that</u>	
	encloses components where fuel is fed can be achieved by ventilation or inerting. These methods are to be equally ac- ceptable to ensure the safety of the space.	
	2. Ventilation of fuel cell spaces	– Reflect 2.3.2
	 (1) Fuel cell spaces are to be equipped with an effective mechanical ventilation system to maintain underpressure of the complete space, taking into consideration the density of potentially leaking fuel gases. (2) For fuel cell spaces on open decks, overpressure ventilation may be considered. (3) The ventilation rate in fuel cell spaces is to be sufficient to dilute the gas/vapour concentration below the flammable range in all maximum probable leakage scenarios due to technical failures. (4) Any ducting used for the ventilation of fuel cell spaces is not to serve any other space. (5) Ventilation ducts from spaces containing reformed fuel piping or release sources are to be vertical or steadily ascending and without sharp bends in order to avoid any possibility for gas to accumulate. 	

Present	Amendment	Reason
	 (6) Two fans are to be installed for the ventilation of the fuel cell space with 100% capacity each. Both fans are to be supplied from separate circuits. In case of failure of one fan, automatic change-over to the other fan shall be provided and indicated by an alarm. (7) In case of loss of ventilation or loss of negative pressure in the fuel cell space, the fuel cell power system is to carry out an automatic, controlled shutdown of the fuel cell and isolation of the fuel supply. (8) Ventilation air inlets for fuel cell spaces are to be taken from areas which, in the absence of the considered inlet, would be non-hazardous. (9) Ventilation air inlets for non-hazardous enclosed spaces are to be taken from non-hazardous areas located at least 1.5 m away from the boundaries of any hazardous area. (10) Ventilation air outlets from fuel cell spaces are to be located in an open area which, in the absence of the considered outlet, would be of the same or lesser hazard than the ventilated space. 3. Inerting of fuel cell spaces Inerting is to be accepted for atmospheric control of the fuel cell space is too small to be entered and sealing arrangements are to ensure that leakages of inert gas to adjacent spaces are prevented. (2) The pressure of inerting media is to always be kept positive and monitored. (3) Any change in the pressure, indicating a breach of the external outer boundary of fuel cell space, or a breach of the boundary with a space where fuel is flowing (e.g. fuel cell stack, reformer, etc.) is to activate a control cell space shall be equipped with a mechanical ventilation to evacuate inerting agent, after an inerting release have been initiated. (5) Inerting system shall not be operable under ongoing maintenance or inspection. 	- Reflect 2.3.3

Present	Amendment	Reason
	 204. Materials 1. The materials within the fuel cell power installation are to be suitable for the intended application and are to comply with recognized standards. 2. The use of combustible materials within the fuel cell power system is to be kept to a minimum. 	- Reflect 2.4
	 205. Piping arrangement for fuel cell power system <u>All pipes containing reformed fuel for fuel cell power systems, where fitted, is to:</u> 1. not be led through enclosed spaces outside of fuel cell spaces; 2. be fully welded as far as practicable; and 	- Reflect 2.5
	 3. be arranged to minimize the number of connections; and 4. use suitable materials to prevent any deterioration owing to hydrogen embrittlement, as necessary, at places where contact with hydrogen is anticipated. For example, austenitic stainless steel of 304, 316, 304L and 316L etc. may be used. 	
	206. Exhaust gas and exhaust air Exhaust gases and exhaust air from the fuel cell power sys- tems are not to be combined with any ventilation except ventilation serving fuel cell spaces, and are to be led to a safe location in the open air.	- Reflect 2.6

Present	Amendment	Reason
Section 3 Electrical Systems <deleted></deleted>	Section 3 Fire Safety	- Deleted Sec 3 because the
	301. General provisions on fire and explosion safety	power installation and Rules
	Fuel cell spaces are to be designed to provide a geo-	for Ships using
	metrical shape that will minimize the accumulation of gases or formation of gas pockets.	Low-flashpoint Fuels is
	1. The fuel cell space is to be regarded as a machinery space	capable to cover.
	of category A according to SOLAS II-2 for fire protection purposes. A fuel cell space is to be bounded by A-60 class	- Reflect 3
	divisions. Where this is deemed to be impracticable, the	
	vide for an equivalent level of safety. The fire-extinguishing	
	system is to be suitable for use with the specific fuel and fuel cell technology. The Society may allow any alternative	
	fire safety measures if the equivalence of the measure is	
	demonstrated by a risk assessment considering the character- istics of fuels for use.	
	302. Fire and explosion protection Fuel cell spaces separated by a single bulkhead are to have	
	sufficient strength to withstand the effects of a local gas	
	explosion in either space, without affecting the integrity of the adjacent space and equipment within that space.	
	303. Fire extinguishing	
	The fire-extinguishing system is to be suitable for use with	
	the specific fuel and fuel cell technology proposed.	
Section 4 Controls, Monitoring and Safety	Section 4 Electrical Systems	- Deleted Sec 4 because the
Systems <deleted></deleted>	Section 4 Electrical Systems	scope is limited to fuel cell
	401. General provisions on electrical systems	power installation and Rules
	1. Electrical equipment is not to be installed in hazardous	Low-flashpoint Fuels is
	enhancement.	capable to cover.
	2. Where electrical equipment including components of fuel	- Reflect 4
	cell systems is installed in hazardous areas, it is to be se- lected, installed and maintained in accordance with IEC	- Reflect 4.1
	60079 and IEC 60092-502 or standards at least equivalent	
	<u>10 most.</u> 10 –	

Present	Amendment	Reason
	3. Means are to be provided for protection of the fuel cell in- stallation against short circuits and flow of reverse current.	
	402. Area classification	- Reflect 4.2
	1. In order to facilitate the selection of appropriate electrical apparatus and the design of suitable electrical installations, hazardous areas are divided into zones 0, 1 and 2, accord- ing to 2. In cases where the prescriptive provisions in 2 are deemed to be inappropriate, area classification according to IEC 60079-10 is to be applied with special consideration by the Society.	
	2. Definition of zones	
	 (1) Hazardous areas zone 0 The interiors of buffer tanks, reformers, pipes and equipment containing low-flashpoint fuel or reformed fuel, any pipework of pressure-relief or other venting. (2) Hazardous areas zone 1 (A) Areas on open deck, or semi- enclosed spaces on deck, within 3 m of any reformed fuel or purge gas outlets or fuel cell space ventilation outlets; (B) Fuel cell exhaust air and exhaust gas outlets; (C) Areas on open deck or semi-enclosed spaces on deck within 1.5 m of fuel cell space entrances, fuel cell space ventilation inlets and other openings into zone 1 spaces; (D) Areas on open deck or semi-enclosed spaces within 3 m in which other sources of release of reformed fuel are located; and (E) Fuel cell spaces. (3) Hazardous areas zone 2 (A) Areas within 1.5 m surrounding open or semi-en- closed spaces of zone 1 as specified above, if not otherwise specified; and (B) Air locks. 3. Ventilation ducts are to have the same area classification as 	
	the ventilated space.	

Present	Amendment	Reason
	Section 5 Control, Monitoring and Safety Systems 501. General provisions on control, monitoring and	
	safety systems	– Reflect 5.1
	1. For gas detection, requirements of Ch 15, Sec 8 of Rules for Ships using Low-flashpoint Fuels are applicable.	
	2. Chemical reactions, such as those taking place during fuel reforming, if fitted, or within the fuel cell, are to be moni-tored, e.g. by means of temperature, pressure or voltage monitoring.	
	502. Fuel cell power installation - safety	- Reflect 5.2
	If limit values determined for the control process, e.g. tem- perature, pressure, voltage, gas concentrations which may lead to hazardous situations are exceeded, the fuel cell power system is to be automatically shut down and inter- locked by an independent protective device.	
	1. All pipes containing reformed fuel for fuel cell power systems, where fitted, are to use fixed hydrogen detectors being capable of detecting a hydrogen leak for places where leakage of hydrogen may occur, such as valves, flanges and seals.	
	2. The fuel cell is to be monitored to the extent necessary to avoid that the safety is impaired.	- Retain Ch 3, 403. 3. (1)
	3. A failure mode and effect analysis examining all possible faults affecting the fuel cell operation and safety is to be submitted. Based on the outcome of the analysis the extent of the monitoring and control is to be decided.	– Retain Ch 3, 403. 3. (2)
	(1) As a minimum, the following items must typically be monitored: (A) cell voltage (B) cell voltage deviations (C) exhaust gas temperature (D) temperature in FC (E) current level	

Present	Amendment	Reason
	 (2) Other typical monitoring that are to be considered: (A) air flow (B) air pressure (C) cooling medium flow, pressure, temperature (if used) (D) fuel flow (E) fuel temperature (F) fuel pressure (G) gas detection in exhaust gas (H) water system level (I) water system pressure (J) water system purity (K) parameters necessary to monitor life-time/deterioration. 	
Section 5 Fuel Cells and Associated Components	Section 6 Fuel Cells and Associated Components	- Change numbering and retain the requirements in Sec
501. General	601. General	0.
1. The For the fuel cell module, the requirements in KS C IEC 62282-2 "Fuel cell technology-Sec.2:fuel cell module" or equivalent standards may be complied with, but will also have to take the environmental and operating conditions in a ship into account.	1. The For the fuel cell module, the requirements in KS C IEC 62282-2 "Fuel cell technology-Sec.2:fuel cell module" or equivalent standards may be complied with, but will also have to take the environmental and operating conditions in a ship into account.	
502. Fuel Cell Stacks	502. Fuel cell stacks	– Deleted duo to the
1. For FC stacks which have a total electrical output greater than 1 MW and which contain flammable materials, addi- tional fire protection measures may be required by the Society.	 For FC stacks which have a total electrical output greater than 1 MW and which contain flammable materials, addi- tional fire protection measures may be required by the Society. 	duplication of 101. 2, 301. 1, 701. 4.
2. If fuel cells are used for supplying essential consumers, then every fuel cell stack is to be subjected to a perform- ance test at the manufacturer's works. The electrical output, airtightness and the thermal output of the fuel cells are to be verified by means of a suitable performance test.	2. If fuel cells are used for supplying essential consumers, then every fuel cell stack is to be subjected to a performance test at the manufacturer"s works. The electrical output, airtightness and the thermal output of the fuel cells are to be verified by means of a suitable performance test.	
3. If fuel cell stacks are used for supplying essential consumers, then redundancy is to be ensured.	3. If fuel cell stacks are used for supplying essential consumers, then redundancy is to be ensured.	

Present	Amendment	Reason
 503. FC Fuel Compressors 1. The FC fuel compressor is to be fitted with accessories and instrumentation necessary for efficient and reliable function. 2. The FC fuel compressor and FC fuel supply are to be arranged for manual remote emergency stop from the following locations: (1) The cargo control room (if any); (2) Navigation bridge; (3) Engine control room; and (4) Fire control station. 3. The possibility for fatigue problem of the high-pressure FC fuel piping due to vibration caused by the high-pressure FC 	 503. FC Fuel Compressors 1. The FC fuel compressor is to be fitted with accessories and instrumentation necessary for efficient and reliable function. 2. The FC fuel compressor and FC fuel supply are to be arranged for manual remote emergency stop from the following locations: (1) The cargo control room (if any); (2) Navigation bridge; (3) Engine control room; and (4) Fire control station. 3. The possibility for fatigue problem of the high-pressure FC fuel piping due to vibration caused by the high-pressure FC fuel piping due to vibration caused by the high-pressure FC 	- Deleted because the scope is limited to fuel cell power installation.
 <u>fuel compressor must be considered.</u> <u>504. Evaporators</u> Heating media for liquefied-gas evaporators or gas preheaters that are routed back into spaces located outside the area of the gas treatment plant is to be passed through degassing containers which are located within the hazardous area. A gas detection and alarm system is to be provided within the degassing container. The outlet opening of the vent pipe of the degassing container is to be located in a safe area and provided with an approved flame arrester. 	 504. Evaporators 1. Heating media for liquefied-gas evaporators or gas preheaters that are routed back into spaces located outside the area of the gas treatment plant is to be passed through degassing containers which are located within the hazardous area. 2. A gas detection and alarm system is to be provided within the degassing container. 3. The outlet opening of the vent pipe of the degassing container is to be located in a safe area and provided with an approved flame arrester. 	- Deleted duo to the duplica- tion of 202. 5.

Present	Amendment	Reason
505. Fuel Reformer systems	602. Fuel reformer systems	
1. General	1. General	
$(1) \sim (5)$ <omitted></omitted>	(1) \sim (5) <same as="" present="" the=""></same>	
2. Firing equipment	2. Firing equipment	
Firing equipment in fuel reformer systems is to be designed for automatic operation. Manual operation (even for emer- gencies) is not permissible.	 (1) Firing equipment in fuel reformer systems is to be designed for automatic operation. Manual operation (even for emergencies) is not permissible. (2) The combustion chamber and the exhaust gas system is to be purged with air or an inerting medium after the firing equipment is switched off. (3) The firing equipment is to be equipped with a type approved burner control box and flame monitoring devices. Reliable operation of the flame monitoring devices is to be verified for the corresponding type of fuel and mode of combustion. (4) The Society may require additional requirements for the firing equipment depending on the type of fuel and the burner. 	
	3. Catalytic converters	
	Catalytic converters in fuel reformer is to consider the en- vironmental conditions, especially the requirements related to vibration loading.	
3 Gas purification	4. Gas purification	
The gas purity required for the operation of the fuel cell is to be monitored by suitable methods. If the determined lim- it values are exceeded, an alarm is to be generated or the system is to be switched off. If this requirement is not met for installations, verification shall be provided that no addi- tional hazard can occur through inadmissible impurities.	The gas purity required for the operation of the fuel cell is to be monitored by suitable methods. If the determined lim- it values are exceeded, an alarm is to be generated or the system is to be switched off. If this requirement is not met for installations, verification shall be provided that no addi- tional hazard can occur through inadmissible impurities.	
4. Exhaust gases	4. Exnaust gases	– Deleted duo to the
The exhaust gases arising during the reforming process is to be discharged safely to the open air at an adequate dis- tance from openings to accommodation, machinery and service spaces.	The exhaust gases arising during the reforming process is to be discharged safely to the open air at an adequate dis- tance from openings to accommodation, machinery and service spaces.	duplication of 206.
5. Residual gases	5. Residual gases	
The recirculation of fuel (residual gas) from the FC to the reformer is permissible. The recirculation is to be protected by an automatic shut-off valve.	The recirculation of fuel (residual gas) from the FC to the reformer is permissible. The recirculation is to be protected by an automatic shut-off valve.	

Present	Amendment	Reason
<u>Section 6</u> Manufacture, Workmanship and Testing	Section 7 Manufacture, Workmanship and Testing	- Change numbering
601. General	701. General	
 The manufacture, testing, inspection and documentation are to be in accordance with the specific requirements and rec- ognized standards given in the Guidance. For FC fuel related equipment, the manufacture, testing and inspection not specified in this section are to be in accord- ance with relevant requirements in Pt.7, Ch.5 of the Rules for Steel Ships. 	 Valves containing reformed fuel are to be tightness tested with hydrogen or an appropriate test gas to show that there is no leakage. After assembly, piping systems containing re- formed fuel are to be tightness tested with hydrogen or an appropriate test gas to show that there is no leakage. Expansion bellows for fuel cell fuel system are subject to type approval. 	 Clarify the requirements of tightness test. Clarify the requirements of type approval.
3. The fuel cell systems are to be subjected to type approval, and the type tests are to be in accordance with the <u>IEC</u> standard 62282-3-1 "Stationary fuel cell power systems-Safety", but will also have to take the environmental and operating conditions in a ship into account.	3. The fuel cell <u>power</u> systems are to be subjected to type approval, and the type tests are to be in accordance with the <u>IEC 62282-3-100</u> "Stationary fuel cell power systems-Safety", but will also have to take the environmental and operating conditions in a ship into account.	
 4. Each fuel cell system subjected to the type approval is to be performed following tests before installation onboard. (Refer to <u>IEC 62282-3-1</u>, para.6) (1) Gas leakage tests (2) Coolant (liquid) leakage tests (3) Normal operation test (4) Dielectric tests simulating abnormal conditions (5) Burner operating characteristics tests (6) CO emission tests 5. For equipment storing, carrying or utilizing hydrogen, relevant specific tests according to recognised standards are to be performed in addition to the tests specified in the Section. 	 702. Shop tests of fuel cell power installation 1. Each fuel cell power system subjected to the type approval is to be performed following tests before installation onboard. (Refer to IEC 62282-3-100, para. 6) (1) Gas leakage tests (2) Coolant (liquid) leakage tests (2) Normal operation test (3) Dielectric strength tests (4) Burner operating tests (6) CO emission tests 5. For equipment storing, carrying or utilizing hydrogen, rele- 	 Reflect according to IEC 62282-3-100 para. 6. -Deleted because the scope is
	vant specific tests according to recognised standards are to be performed in addition to the tests specified in the Section.	limited to fuel cell power installation.

Present	Amendment	Reason
		- Deleted because the scope
<u>602. ~ 607. </u> <omitted></omitted>	602. ~ 607. < deleted>	is limited to fuel cell power
		installation.
608. Onboard tests of <u>FC system</u>	703. Onboard tests of fuel cell power installation	- Retain the requirements in
1. Before the tests commence, a detailed test programme is to	1. Before the tests commence, a detailed test programme is to	608.
be submitted and approved.	be submitted and approved.	- Modify according to new
2. The <u>FC entire system</u> is to be subjected to the following tests after installation on board: However, the items to be tested during sea trial may be included in sea trial program.	2. The <u>fuel cell power installation</u> is to be subjected to the following tests after installation on board: However, the items to be tested during sea trial may be included in sea trial program.	definitions.
(1) Functional trials of components :	(1) Functional trials of components :	
Safety shut-off valves, automatic shut-off valves, level	Safety shut-off valves, automatic shut-off valves, level	
 Safety shut-off valves, automatic shut-off valves, level indicators, temperature measurement devices, pressure gauges, gas detection systems and alarm devices shall be subjected to a functional trial. (2) Trials of the protective devices and system : During the trial, it is to be verified that, in the event of the following faults, the <u>FC system</u> is automatically transferred into a safe condition: (A) Alarm of the fire detection devices (B) Alarm of the gas detection system (C) Failure of the programmable logic controllers(PLCs) (E) Faults in the protective devices or system It is to be verified that the requirements of the risk analysis performed as per <u>101. 1</u>, are met. (3) Functional trials of the <u>FC system</u> The following operating conditions of the <u>FC system</u> is to be tested (as far as applicable): (A) Automatic start-up of the <u>FC system</u> 	 Safety shut-off valves, automatic shut-off valves, level indicators, temperature measurement devices, pressure gauges, gas detection systems and alarm devices shall be subjected to a functional trial. (2) Trials of the protective devices and system : During the trial, it is to be verified that, in the event of the following faults, the <u>fuel cell power installation</u> is automatically transferred into a safe condition: (A) Alarm of the fire detection devices (B) Alarm of the gas detection system (C) Failure of the power supply (D) Failure of the protective devices or system It is to be verified that the requirements of the risk analysis performed as per <u>Ch 2, 101. 1</u>, are met. (3) Functional trials of the <u>fuel cell power installation</u> The following operating conditions of the <u>fuel cell power installation</u> 	
(B) Operational switch-off of the <u>FC</u> system	(B) Operational switch-off of the <u>fuel cell power in-</u>	
(C) Load change, load steps	stallation	
(D) Load shedding (E) Switch off during system malfunctions, that do not	(C) Load change, load steps (D) Load shedding	
endanger the safety of persons and equipment	(E) Switch-off during system malfunctions that do not	
	endanger the safety of persons and equipment	

Present	Amendment	Reason
 (4) Functional trials of the ship Within the scope of the functional trials, the interaction of the <u>FC system</u> with the ship systems is to be tested as follows (as far as applicable): (A) Power generation by the <u>FC system</u> alone (B) <u>FC system</u> together with conventional shipboard generation of electrical power (C) <u>FC system</u> together with batteries (D) Change-over to the emergency source of electrical power (E) Switching the <u>FC system</u> online or offline If the <u>FC system</u> constitutes the main propulsion system of the ship, it is to be verified that the ship has ad- equate propulsion power in all maneuvering situations. ↓ 	 (4) Functional trials of the ship Within the scope of the functional trials, the interaction of the <u>fuel cell power installation</u> with the ship systems is to be tested as follows (as far as applicable): (A) Power generation by the <u>fuel cell power installation</u> alone (B) <u>fuel cell power installation</u> together with conven- tional shipboard generation of electrical power (C) <u>fuel cell power installation</u> together with batteries (D) Change-over to the emergency source of electrical power (E) Switching the <u>fuel cell power installation</u> online or offline If the <u>fuel cell power installation</u> constitutes the main propulsion system of the ship, it is to be verified that the ship has adequate propulsion power in all maneuver- ing situations. ↓ 	- Modify according to new definitions.